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STOUGH v. CRENSHAW COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION: PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
SEGREGATION ACADEMIES
I. Introduction
In a recent eleventh circuit case, Stough v. Crenshaw County
Board of Education,' two tenured school teachers challenged a school
board policy which prohibited board employees from sending their
children to private schools.2 The policy provided that "no person
shall be employed by the Crenshaw County Board of Education
who is in violation of this policy." 3 The teachers had enrolled their
children in Crenshaw Christian Academy, a racially segregated acad-
emy created in the wake of public school desegregation.4
The school board gave four reasons for the policy: (1) to promote
good relationships among teachers;5 (2) to prevent the detrimental
effect of noncompliance on a teachers' performance; 6 (3) to insure
favorable employee-employer relationships; 7 and (4) to facilitate de-
segregation of the county public school system.' The court held that
1. 744 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1480.
3. Stough v. Crenshaw County Board of Education, 579 F. Supp. 1091, 1093
(M.D. Al. 1983).
4. Id. at 1093. A "segregation academy" is a "private school which operates
on a racially segregated basis as an alternative for white students seeking to avoid
desegregated public schools." Note, Runyon v. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens the
Doors of Discriminatory Private Schools, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 179 (1977).
5. Stough, 579 F. Supp. at 1096.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1097.
8. Id. In response to desegregation orders in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
enrollment in southern private schools increased substantially from approximately
25,000 in 1966 to 535,000 by 1972. See Note, Segregation Academies and State
Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441 (1973).
The problem of white parents avoiding court desegregation orders by with-
drawing their children from public schools or by moving away from the integrating
district is commonly referred to as "white flight." Farley, Richards, & Wurdock,
School Desegregation and White Flight: An Investigation of Competing Models
and Their Discrepant Findings, 53 Soc. OF EDUC. 123, 124 (1980). The problem
is still present in our school systems. By 1982, the estimated enrollment in private
segregation academies grew to more than one million. Hearings on IRS Tax Ex-
emptions and Segregated Private Schools Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
39 (1982) (statement of Dr. Frank A. Rose, President, The L.Q.C. Lamar Society,
Inc.). Segregated private academies have a negative impact on desegregation because
such institutions draw white students away from the public schools. The white
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a parent's right to direct the education of his child is a fundamental
right.9 Therefore, any limitation on this right could be justified only
by a showing of a compelling state interest.' 0 The court held that
none of the four reasons advanced by the school board were suf-
ficiently compelling to justify the policy.'
This Note examines whether parents have a fundamental right to
send their children to private, racially segregated academies. Part II
discusses the constitutional standards to be applied in deciding whether
a public employee's first amendment rights are being violated.' 2 Part
III discusses the rights of public school teachers as public employees.' 3
Part IV examines the interest of teachers as parents. 4 In the context
of whether parents have a fundamental right to send their children
to private, racially segregated schools, the Supreme Court cases of
Runyon v. McCrary'5 and Roberts v. United States Jaycees'6 will
be analyzed.". The state's interest in eradicating discrimination in
education also will be discussed.' 8 Finally, this Note examines the
question of whether a policy like that of the Crenshaw County school
board is unconstitutionally overbroad.' 9 This Note concludes that
there is no fundamental right of parents to send their children to
private, racially segregated schools.
II. Constitutional Standard
A. The Mt. Healthy Three Step Test
The seminal case regarding the question of whether a public
students that remain in the public schools become the minority and are led to
believe that they are receiving an inferior education. Id. at 41 (statement of Mardi
A. Osman, Research and Program Officer, The L.Q.C. Lamar Society, Inc.).
In Stough, the school board feared that by sending their children to Crenshaw
Christian Academy, the teachers were "encouraging white students to leave the
public schools and attend a segregated private school." Brief for Appellant at 26,
Stough v. Crenshaw County Board of Education, 744 F.2d 1479 (lth Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief]. Indeed, after the district court's decision
in favor of the school teachers, enrollment at Crenshaw Christian Academy increased
from 140 students to 180 students. Id. at 25.
9. Stough, 744 F.2d at 1480.
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
11. Stough, 744 F.2d at 1482.
12. See infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-138 and accompanying text.
15. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
16. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
17. See infra notes 139-91 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 224-52 and accompanying text.
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employee's first amendment rights had been violated by a state
regulation is Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle.20 In
Mt. Healthy, an untenured public school teacher was discharged
after he revealed to a radio station that the school principal had
adopted a dress code. The Court, while deciding that this com-
munication was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments,
nevertheless, upheld the teacher's discharge. 21 The teacher also had
been involved in several arguments with fellow employees and had
made an obscene gesture at students.2 2 The Court found that the
lower court had failed to determine whether the teacher would have
been discharged in the absence of the protected conduct.23 In reaching
its conclusion, the Supreme Court employed the following three step
analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff-public employee had carried the
burden of proof in demonstrating that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected; 24 (2) whether the protected activity was a sub-
stantial or motivating factor in the actions taken against the plaintiff;25,
and (3) whether the state had defeated the plaintiff's claim by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would
have been taken in the absence of the protected activity. 26 The issue
in Stough concerns the first step of the Mt. Healthy test. 21
In Stough,2" the school board denied the teachers' request for an
exemption from the school board policy prohibiting its employees
from sending their children to private schools. 29 The school board
never claimed that it was dissatisfied with the plaintiffs' job per-
formance, 0 their breach of the board policy prohibiting them from
sending their children to private schools notwithstanding. It is ap-
parent that the only factor motivating the denial of the teachers'
20. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
21. Id. at 284-85.
22. Id. at 281-82.
23. Id. at 287.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The eleventh circuit in Stough stated: "There is no question in this case
that the board's policy interferes with the plaintiffs' exercise of their constitutional
right to control the education of their children." Stough, 744 F.2d at 1480. This
Note questions whether parents have a constitutional right to send their children
to racially segregated private schools.
28. See supra note 1.
29. Stough, 744 F.2d at 1480.
30. The argument of the school board was that by sending their children to a
private, racially segregated school, the teachers' job performance would be impaired
to a material and substantial degree. Appellant's Brief, supra note 8 at 7.
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requests for exemption was the fact that the teachers insisted on
sending their children to a racially segregated academy.3
The court's concern in Stough did not rest with the second and
third steps of the Mt. Healthy analysis.3 2 The issue focused on the
first step, specifically, whether the public school teachers have dem-
onstrated that their conduct was constitutionally protected.
B. The Three Tier Analysis
When a state law infringes upon a right held by one of its citizens,
a determination of whether that right is fundamental33 is critical. If
a statute invades a fundamental right, the courts will apply a strict
scrutiny test, and the statute is likely to be struck down.3 4 When a
statute invades a right not deemed to be fundamental, a rational
relation test will be applied, and the statute will probably be upheld.35
1. Strict Scrutiny
If a right is deemed to be fundamental,3 6 the Supreme Court has
held that a regulation limiting it may be justified only by a "com-
pelling state interest." 37 Moreover, the regulation "must be narrowly
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
33. Fundamental rights are those rights "with textual recognition in the Con-
stitution, or its amendments, or values found to be implied because they are
'fundamental' to freedom in American society, as reflected by history and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
34. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.5 (2d ed. 1979).
36. When a right is infringed upon by a state, the fourteenth amendment is
invoked:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court held that the rights
of "life, liberty, and property" included not only those enumerated in the Bill of
Rights but also rights which are implicit in the first ten amendments, such as a
right to privacy. Id., at 484-86. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in stating that "the right to
educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the force
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 482.
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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drawn to express only [the] legitimate state interests at stake." 3 This
is a strict scrutiny test. 39 That is, if a right is protected by the
Constitution, the Supreme Court will carefully scrutinize the in-
fringement on that right to see if the regulation is justified by a
compelling state interest.4"
2. Minimal Rationality
When rights are deemed not to be fundamental, a less stringent
test is applied. 41 In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,42 sus-
taining a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of imitation
milk, 43 the Court held that the economic regulation was presumptively
valid, and only the existence of a rational basis for the legislation
need be shown. 44 This minimal rationality test gives wide deference
to the governmental regulation. 45
3. Intermediate Tier
The intermediate level of scrutiny developed by the Supreme Court
in Morey v. Doud,46 did not require the state to prove a compelling
state interest.47 In Morey, an Illinois act 48 which exempted the Amer-
ican Express Company from licensing and regulation requirements
was held to be a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 49 The Court stated that "a statutory dis-
crimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related
38. Id. at 155.
39. According to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the idea of strict scrutiny
acknowledges that political choices which burden fundamental rights or suggest
prejudice against racial or other minorities, "must be subjected to close analysis
in order to preserve substantive values of equality and liberty." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 (1978).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
41. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 152-54.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
47. The Court stated that "a statutory discrimination must be based on dif-
ferences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is
found." Id. at 465.
48. The Illinois Community Currency Exchange Act, 1943 Ill. Laws 233. Amer-
ican Express Company money orders did not fall under the definition of "community
currency exchange." 1947 Ill. Laws 307, § 1.
49. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. at 469.
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to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." 50 Under this test,
a state must show something more than a rational basis for the
regulation; there must be a rational relation between the regulation
and the objective it seeks to achieve.
The Court has applied this intermediate test when a state regulation
was alleged to have been a violation of the due process clause.5" In
Kelley v. Johnson,5 2 the Court upheld a Suffolk County, New York
regulation which limited the hair length of police officers.53 Assuming
that matters of personal appearance were liberty interests within the
ambit of the due process clause,54 the Court found that the state
had a duty to protect the safety of persons and property.5 Since
there was a rational connection between the regulation and the
objective of promoting the safety of persons and property, the
regulation was upheld.5 6
III. The Rights of Teachers as Public Employees
The Supreme Court formerly held that persons seeking employment
in the public schools had no right to do so on their own terms.57
This meant that public employment could be conditioned on the
surrender of constitutional rights. 8 However, the Court has discarded
50. Id. at 465. However, in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976),
the Supreme Court overruled Morey v. Doud and did not apply a rational connection
test to an economic regulation. In Dukes, a New Orleans ordinance prohibited
pushcart vendors from selling foodstuffs in the city's French quarter, but exempted
from its prohibition vendors who had operated a pushcart business within the
French quarter for eight years prior to January 1, 1972. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 298.
After noting that the ordinance was purely an economic regulation, the Court
upheld the ordinance stating:
States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies
under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with
substantially less than mathematical exactitude .... In short, the judiciary
may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fun-
damental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. ...
Id. at 303.
Morey v. Doud, a case in which the Supreme Court applied a rational relation test
and not a minimal rationality test to an economic regulation, was overruled. Id. at 306.
The case has been discussed on this Note only to introduce and illustrate the rational
relation test.
51. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 249.
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id.
57. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
58. Id.
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this premise.5 9 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6° the Court ab-
solutely rejected the theory that public employment could be premised
on any conditions regardless of how unreasonable. 61 While there is
no constitutionally protected right to teach in a public school,62 a
teacher may not be deprived of a position for a constitutionally
impermissible reason. 63
The constitutional rights of teachers are not absolute. 64 For ex-
ample, a state can limit a public school teacher's first amendment
right to freedom of speech to a greater degree than it can limit a
non-public employee's right to freedom of speech. 65 In Pickering v.
Board of Education,66 the Court provided a balancing test in which
"the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern ' 67 were balanced against "the interest of
the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees. ' 68
In Pickering, a teacher wrote a letter to a newspaper criticizing
the school board's allocation of school funds between educational
and athletic programs. 69 The letter was later published by the local
newspaper. 70 The Court held that a teacher's exercise of his right
to speak on issues of public importance could not furnish the basis
for his dismissal from public employment. 71 The teacher's exercise
of his right to speak on public matters outweighed the state's interest
in having loyal employees. 72 A public school teacher's constitutionally
protected right of free speech recently has been expanded by the
courts to encompass speech concerning internal matters not related
to any issue of public importance. 73
59. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
60. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
61. Id. at 605-06.
62. Adler, 342 U.S. at 492.
63. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. at 605-06.
64. See infra notes 65-103 and accompanying text.
65. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 568.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 566.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 574-75.
72. Id. at 571-72.
73. See White v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1168 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1982) (teacher's speech is not necessarily unprotected because it concerns internal
operating procedures rather than issues of public importance); Brown v. Bullard
Indep. School Dist., 640 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981)
(teacher's conversation with principal of public school which related to conditions
of employment was protected by first amendment).
1985]
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However, a teacher's right to freedom of speech is not unlimited. 74
A state's interest in promoting the efficiency of its public services
may outweigh a teacher's right to free speech if the expression results
in a material and substantial75 interference with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of a school. 76 In Anderson
v. Evans,77 a tenured public school teacher was dismissed for " 'con-
duct unbecoming a teacher' ",78 after she stated to the principal that
she hated all blacks.7 9 The teacher taught in an all black school and
subsequent to her statement, witnesses testified that her effectiveness
as a teacher declined,80 and that she showed hostility toward the
principal."1 The sixth circuit held that the school board's interest in
maintaning an efficient system outweighed the teacher's interest in
making derogatory remarks.12
Federal courts also have protected public school teachers' first
amendment right to freely associate. For example, in Lake Park
Education Association v. Board of Education of Lake Park,83 the
right of a school teacher to be a member of a union was protected.'
In another situation, the tenth circuit in Childers v. Independent School
District No. 1 of Bryan County" protected a public school teacher's
right to help organize a union. 6
There have been cases in which the courts have ruled in favor
of state regulations that infringed on the rights of teachers.87 For
example, in Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District,8 a teacher
was dismissed because she insisted on cohabition with a man after the
school board warned her not to do so.8 9 The eighth circuit upheld
74. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
75. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969).
76. Id. at 509. A material and substantial interference would be conduct which
would disrupt classwork or invade the rights of others. Id. at 513.
77. 660 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id. "Often when he [the principal] encountered Mrs. Anderson and spoke
to her she would just turn her head and look away." Id.
82. Id. at 159.
83. 526 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
84. Id. at 717.
85. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 1341-42.
87. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
88. 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976).
89. Id. at 802.
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the dismissal, finding that there was some basis for the school board's
concern that the teacher's conduct might have an adverse effect on
her students. 90 Moreover, the court held that, although there is a
fundamental right to privacy, 9' a sexual relationship outside of mar-
riage is not constitutionally protected. 92
In Norbeck v. Davenport Community School District,93 the eighth
circuit held that the interest of the school board in efficient school
administration was paramount to a high school principal's right to
act as chief negotiator for a teachers' union. 94 Recently, the reas-
signment of a graduate assistant from teaching to research, after it
was discovered that she was having a homosexual relationship with
a student who was not in any of her classes, also was upheld. 95
Finally, in Cook v. Hudson96 the fifth circuit held that the failure
of a school board to rehire nontenured public school teachers because
they had enrolled their children in a private, racially segregated
school was not a violation of the first or fourteenth Amendments.9 7
Each of the three judges deciding the case wrote separate opinions.
Judge Coleman, writing for the majority, stated that the Constitution
did not deny a public school board the authority to adopt a policy
to ensure the undivided dedication of its teachers. 98 Judge Roney
agreed with the holding but on a narrow ground. Since the teachers
were untenured, they had the burden of proving that the school
board's action in not rehiring them was unconstitutional. 99 The
teachers did not meet this burden.' °°
Judge Clark dissented,' 0 stating that a fundamental right was
involved, specifically, the right of parents to direct the upbringing
and education of their children. 02 Since the school board could not
show that the job performance of the teachers had declined, the
necessary compelling state interest was not present. 03
90. Id. at 808.
91. Id. at 806.
92. Id.
93. 545 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977).
94. Id. at 67.
95. Naragon v. Wharton, 572 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 (M.D. La. 1983), aff'd, 737
F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984).
96. 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 165 (1976).
97. Id. at 749 (Coleman, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 749-50 (Roney, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 750.
101. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 751-57.
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IV. The Interest of Teachers as Parents
A. The Right of Parents to Direct the Upbringing and
Education of Their Children
That parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing
and education of their children is unquestionable. This right has
been recognized by the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska'°4 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.05 In Meyer, a state law prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages to children who had not completed
the eighth grade was struck down. l°6 The Court held that the law
impermissibly interfered with "the power of parents to control the
education of their own [children]." 107 In Pierce the Court invalidated
an Oregon law which required parents to send their children to
public schools under pain of criminal penalty. 08 The fundamental
right of the parent to send his child to a private school also was
recognized by the Court.1°9
This same right again was acknowledged in Wisconsin v. Yoder. l" 0
Members of the Old Order Amish religion refused to comply with
a Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law which required parents
to cause their children under the age of sixteen to attend public or
private school."' The Amish parents declined to send their children
to school beyond the eighth grade because they believed that sec-
ondary school attendance was contrary to the Amish way of life." 2
The Court held in favor of the Amish parents, stating that the
Wisconsin law compelled the parents to perform acts undeniably at
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious belief and thus
deprived them of the free exercise of their religion." 3 The State of
Wisconsin contended that a system of mandatory education was
compelling for two reasons. First, some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively in an open
104. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
105. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
106. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
107. Id. at 401.
108. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
109. Id.
110. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
111. Id. at 207.
112. Id. at 210. Specifically, Old Order Amish communities believed that "sal-
vation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and
worldly influence." Id.
113. Id. at 219.
956 [Vol. XIII
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political system." 4 Second, education prepares individuals to be self-
sufficient members of society." 5 The Court, however, found that
the Amish traditionally were productive, law-abiding members of
society, and that they provided their own vocational education during
their children's adolescent years." 6 Therefore, the Court held that
the Wisconsin compulsory attendance law was not compelling as to
the Amish." 7 Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that the primary
role of parents in the upbringing of their children is an established
American tradition."18
However, a state does have the right to interfere with the parent-
child relationship in order to protect the health and safety of the
child." 9 In Prince v. Massachusetts,20 a state statute 2' prohibited
minors from distributing newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or other
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 225.
117. Id.
The independence and successful social functioning of the Amish com-
munity for a period approaching almost three centuries and more than
200 years in this country are strong evidence that there is at best a
speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an
additional one or two years of compulsory formal education. Against
this background it would require a more particularized showing from
the State on this point to justify the severe interference with religious
freedom such additional compulsory attendance would entail.
Id. at 226-27.
118. Id. at 232. However, in his concurrence, Justice White cautioned that
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children was not absolute.
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters lends no support to the contention that parents may
replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what
knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of society . .. ."
Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), the
district court stated that the parental right to control the education of their children
was not without limit. Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1167. "The parent cannot assert
an absolute freedom to remove his child from all schooling, or to send him to a
school where the curriculum includes not only mathematics but also the desirability
and techniques of immediate violent overthrow of the government." Id.
119. This right derives from the state's power of parens patriae. Parens patriae
refers to the state's limited paternalistic power to protect or promote the welfare
of certain individuals, such as young children and mental incompetents, who lack
the capacity to act in their own best interests. Developments in the Law, The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1199 (1980).
120. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
121. Section 80 of the statute provided:
Whoever furnishes or sells to any minor any article of any description
with the knowledge that the minor intends to sell such article in violation
of any provision of sections sixty-nine to seventy-three, inclusive, or after
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
merchandise while standing on public streets. 22 The statute also
made it unlawful for a parent or guardian to permit a minor to
work in violation of this law. 123
A Jehovah's Witness who had allowed her children to sell religious
materials in public challenged the statute, claiming that it violated
her freedom of religion under the first amendment as well as her
parental rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 12 4 The Court rejected this claim and upheld the statute, finding
that "the family is not beyond regulation in the public interest ...
[aInd neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation."'2 5 The Court held that "the state's authority over chil-
dren's activities is broader than over like actions of adults,"', 26 and
the interest of the state in protecting children from the harmful
effects of child employment was valid. 27
In Ginsberg v. New York, 28 a New York statute2 9 prohibiting
having received written notice to this effect from any officer charged
with the enforcement thereof, or knowingly procures or encourages any
minor to violate any provisions of said sections, shall be punished by
a fine of not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars or by
imprisonment for not more than two months, or both.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 80 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 81 provided:
Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control
who compels or permits such minor to work in violation of any provision
of sections sixty to seventy-four, inclusive, . . . shall for a first offence
be punished by a fine of not less than two nor more than ten dollars
or by imprisonment for not more than five days, or both; and for a
subsequent offence by a fine of not less than five nor more than twenty-
five dollars or by imprisonment for not more than ten days, or both.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 81 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976).
122. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160-61.
123. Id. at 161.
124. Id. at 164.
125. Id. at 166.
126. Id. at 168.
127. Id. at 168-69.
128. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
129. The statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary
consideration to a minor: (a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture,
motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person
or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or
sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors, or (b) any book,
pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however produced, or sound recording
which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) . . . , or explicit
and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement,
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole,
is harmful to minors.
1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 327, § 2.
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the sale of pornographic pictures to a minor under the age of
seventeen was upheld. 130 Again, the Supreme Court affirmed the
interest of the state in protecting the well-being of its youth", and
held that prohibiting the sale of pornographic pictures to minors
was rationally related to the objective of safeguarding such minors
from harm. 13 2
In a 1976 case, Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth'33,
the Supreme Court recognized the right of an infant to have an
abortion without the consent of her parents. 3 4 A section of the
Missouri Public Health and Welfare statute'35 required the written
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for
an unmarried minor's abortion during the first twelve weeks of her
pregnancy. 3 6 The State of Missouri argued that the purpose of the
statute was to protect the welfare of minors. 3 7 However, the Court
struck down the section, holding that there was no significant state
interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent.'38
Such a requirement would not serve to strengthen the family unit,
nor would it enhance parental authority. 39
B. Application of Supreme Court Precedent in Stough
In Stough, the eleventh circuit stated that the school board policy
prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools
130. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633.
131. Id. at 640.
132. Id. at 643.
133. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
134. Id. at 75.
135. 1974 Mo. Laws 810.
136. Section 3 provided:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy except: ... (4) With the written consent of one
parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried
and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by
a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother.
1974 Mo. Laws 810.
137. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 72.
138. Id. at 75; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (Massachusetts
consent statute struck down because it did not afford pregnant minor opportunity
to receive independent judicial determination that she was mature enough to consent
or that abortion would be in her best interest).
139. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 75. See generally Ford, The Evolution
of a Constitutional Right to an Abortion, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 271 (1983) (discussion
of constitutional right to have an abortion); Comment, Abortion: From Roe to
Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 393 (1984) (discussion
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interfered with the teachers' exercise of their constitutional right as
parents to control the education of their children. 140 The court failed
to consider the question of whether sending children to segregated
academies falls within the penumbra of this constitutional right.' 41
To answer this inquiry it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's
decision in Runyon v. McCrary42 and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,143 concerning the question of whether an organization could
use the first amendment right to freedom of association to protect
its discriminatory admissions policy.
1. Runyon v. McCrary
In Runyon v. McCrary, 44 two black children brought actions
against private schools in Virginia after they were denied admission
for the stated reason that the schools were not integrated. 41 The
Supreme Court held that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 146 which forbids racial discrimination in the making and en-
forcing of private contracts, 47 prohibits private schools from denying
admission to prospective students because the students are black. 41
The Court held that racially discriminatory admissions policies denied
blacks this right to contract. 49
As a defense, the private academies asserted the right of white
parents to freedom of association, the right of privacy, and the
right of parents to direct the education of their children. 50 The
of state's ability to regulate abortion process); Note, The Abortion Decision for
Minnesota Minors: Who Decides?, 9 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV 194 (1984) (discussion
of Minnesota's parental notification statute).
140. Stough, 744 F.2d at 1480.
141. See supra note 27.
142. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
143. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
144. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
145. Id. at 165.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
147. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. §1981 (1982).
148. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172.
149. Id. at 172-73.
150. Id. at 175.
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Court found that section 1981 did not violate these rights.15' A first
amendment right to freedom of association was recognized as was
the right of parents to send their children to private schools which
promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable.' However,
the Court stated that "it d[id] not follow that the practice of
excluding racial minorities from such institutions [was] also protected
by the same principle.' '5 3
The Court further decided that the discontinuance of the discrim-
inatory practice would not violate any parental rights recognized in
Meyer and Pierce.5 4 The Court stressed that the limited scope of
Pierce simply affirmed the right of private schools to exist., Indeed,
in Pierce,5 6 the Court stated that there were interests of the state
which would override the rights of parents. For example, the state
has the power to reasonably regulate private schools, 57 to supervise
and examine teachers and students,"58 and to require that nothing
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare. 5 9
In its discussion of the right of privacy, the Court decided that
government is not necessarily restricted by the Constitution from
regulating the implementation of parental decisions concerning a
child's education. 60 While parents have a constitutional right to send
their children to private schools and a right to select private schools
that offer specialized insructions, 61 the Court insisted that parents
do not have a constitutional right to provide their children with
private school education unfettered by reasonable government reg-
151. Id. at 175-79.
152. Id. at 175-76.
153. Id. at 176.
154. Id. at 177.
155. Id.
156. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
157. Id. at 534.
158. Id.
159. Id.; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (states have
power to pass compulsory school-attendance statutes to promulgate reasonable
standards in education); In re Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, 442, 672 P.2d 1093, 1098
(1983) (compulsory school attendance laws have rational relationship to legitimate
state purpose of educating its children); State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb.
802, 816-17, 301 N.W.2d 571, 579, appeal dismissed 454 U.S. 803 (1981) (parents
have right to send their children to non-public schools but do not have right to
be completely unfettered by reasonable government regulations as to quality of
education furnished); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 889 (N.D. 1980) (states'
compelling interest in providing education for its people outweigh parents' religious
conviction against use of certified teachers).
160. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 178.
161. Id.
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ulation.162 Indeed, many states now have statutes which prohibit
some or all private schools from engaging in racially discriminating
practices. 163
The holding in Runyon v. McCrary is composed of two basic
tenets. First, private schools cannot discriminate according to race
in their admissions policies. Second, the application of Section 1981
in prohibiting racial discrimination does not infringe on any parental
rights.164 Therefore, if a private school were forced to admit blacks,
the rights of white parents who are sending their children to this
racially segregated school would not be violated. It is logical to
conclude that parents do not have a constitutionally protected right
to send their children to racially segregated schools.1
65
162. Id. at 176-77.
163. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(1), (2) (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5902(10),
67-5909(6) (Supp. 1984); INDIANA ANN. STAT. §§ 22-9-1-2(a), 22-9-1-3(1) (Burns
Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151C, §§ 1(b), 2(a)(1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 37.2401, 37.2402 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 363.01(20),
363.03(5) (Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-5(1) (West Supp. 1985); N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296-4 (McKinney 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 5003(1) (1974), §
5004(a)(1) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-2(11), 34-35-6(f) (Supp. 1983).
164. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176-77.
165. The commentators have agreed that since Runyon, white parents do not
have a constitutional right to send their children to private, racially segregated
academies. See Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine-
Moose Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary, 77 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 28
n. 140 (1977); Comment, Desegregating Private Schools Under Section 1981, 41 ALB.
L. REV. 759, 770 (1977); Note, Civil Rights: Section 1981 Right to Contract as a
Bar to Racial Discrimination in Private Schools, 31 ARK. L. REV. 314, 320-21
(1977); Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrim-
ination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARv. L. REV. 412, 437-40 (1976);
Note, Section 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment After Runyon v. McCrary-
On the Doorsteps of Discriminatory Private Clubs, 29 STAN. L. REV. 747, 766-68
(1977); Note, Civil Rights-Race Discrimination-Section 1981 Applicable to Private
School Admissions, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 247, 249 (1977); Note, Section 1981 and
Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination,
84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1460 (1975).
It is questionable whether a private, sectarian school would be allowed to refuse
to admit black children under a freedom of religion argument. In Brown v. Dade
Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), the fifth circuit affirmed
the issuance of an injunction which enjoined a private, sectarian school from barring
two black children from enrolling in the school because of their race. The court
found that the segregation policy of the sectarian school was not religiously based
because it had been recently instituted, could be changed by a majority vote of
church members, and was not central to church doctrine. Id. at 312-13. In Fiedler
v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980), a white girl was
expelled from a private, sectarian school for having a romantic relationship with
a black student. The school asserted that the action was based on a bona fide
religious belief that interracial romantic relationships were undesirable and should
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The rights of white parents wishing to send their children to
segregated academies can be analyzed another way. In the context
of freedom of association, it has been suggested that there is a
distinction between "primary" and "secondary" relationships. 166 A
primary relationship, which is characterized by highly personal, in-
timate association, should never be inhibited by law. 167 A secondary
relationship is characterized by impersonal, highly formalized rela-
tions between people. 168 These relationships are deemed less impor-
tant, and thus, in the formation of such a relationship, society can
demand that the individual eliminate from consideration any factors
such as race, creed, color, or sex which have no bearing upon the
relationship. 169
If the argument that the relationship between parents and their
children is highly personal and intimate 70 is valid, government should
be unable to regulate this relationship.' 7' However, this argument is
flawed. While the decision of a parent to send a child to a segregated
academy is highly personal, that decision inevitably leads to the
creation of a public institution because a private school holds itself
out to the general public through an offer of its facilities. 72 Once
such an offer is made public, the school has set forth its willingness
be protected by the free exercise clause. Id. at 1147-51. The court disagreed,
however, finding that this belief belonged solely to the school's principal and was
not a precept of the religion. Id. at 1152-53.
166. Sengstock and Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 59, 117 (1967) [hereinafter Discrimination].
167. Id. at 117. But see Note, Section 1981 and Discrimination in Private Schools,
1976 DUKE L.J. 125, 145 (1976). The state does have the power to regulate even
the most primary relationships. Id.
168. Discrimination supra note 166, at 117-18. An example of a secondary rela-
tionship is the relation between a buyer and a seller. Id. at 117.
169. Id. at 118.
170. A primary relationship is the type of relationship "which one may have
with his spouse, his closest friends, his parents, and perhaps his siblings." Id. at
117.
171. Id.
172. The lower court in Runyon stated that the private schools were public in
nature. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1088 (4th Cir. 1975).
Though certain intimate and private affairs of men and women are
protected from governmental interference, the schoolhouse is far from
the realm of protection. The right is appropriately recognized in certain
instances when only a few people are involved in activity unintended for
the public view. In such instances, it is more than likely or inevitable
that there is some plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race.
When relations between husband and wife are involved, their purpose
to exclude all the rest of the world has no racial connotations. When
a school holds itself open to the public, however; or even to those
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
to establish secondary relationships and its freedom to discriminate
may therefore be curtailed.'73
2. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,174 the Supreme Court upheld
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, 175 which provides that it is an
unfair discriminatory practice to deny any person the full and equal
enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of
race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex. 176 The
objective of the United States Jaycees (Jaycees), a national, non-
profit membership corporation, is to promote and foster the growth
and development of young men's civic organizatiofis in the United
States. 78 In 1974 and 1975, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters
of the Jaycees began admitting women as members, in violation of
the national organization's by-laws. 78 The national organization im-
posed sanctions on the two local chapters and later brought suit
against various state officials to prevent the enforcement of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. 17 9 The Jaycees claimed that by re-
quiring the organization to accept women as regular members, ap-
plication of the Act would violate the male members' constitutional
right to freedom of association.8 0
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan recognized that freedom
of association is a fundamental element of personal liberty8, and
that "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State
because of the role such relationships [play] in safeguarding the
applicants meeting established qualifications, there is no perceived privacy
of the sort that has been given constitutional protection.
Id.
173. Discrimination, supra note 166, at 120.
174. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
175. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1985).
176. Id. A place of public accomodations is defined as "a business, accomodation,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether
licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accom-
odations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West Supp. 1985).
177. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3247.
178. Id. at 3247-48.
179. Id. at 3248.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 3249.
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individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."' 2
However, all relationships do not have the same degree of intimacy.
There is a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated
of personal relationships,' 3 and determining the limits of state au-
thority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular as-
sociation entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate the relationship on the spectrum.8 4
The Supreme Court found that since the local chapters were neither
small nor selective in judging applicants for membership, except for
the denial of membership to women, the Jaycees chapters lacked
the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional pro-
tection to the decision of its members to exclude women.8 5 Moreover,
Justice Brennan emphasized that Minnesota had a compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens8 6 because
such acts cause unique, social evils.8 7
The Effect of the Runyon v. McCrary and Roberts v. United
States Jaycees Holdings
The holdings in both Runyon v. McCrary and Roberts v. United
States Jaycees suggest that, while the Supreme Court recognized the
constitutional right to freedom of association, the right of privacy,
and the right of parents to direct the education of their children,
none of these rights are absolute. In both cases, the Court balanced
the interest of private individuals to discriminate against the gov-
ernment's interest in eradicating discrimination. 88 In each case, the
Court upheld the statute which sought to eliminate discrimination. 8 9
The Court will not recognize a constitutional right to discriminate
182. Id.
183. Id. at 3251.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 3253.
187. Id. at 3255.
188. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177-79; United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3252-55.
For a discussion of the right to discriminate, see Note, Federal Power to Regulate
Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconsruction
Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974). For a discussion of the states'
obligation to end segregation in education, see Chemerinsky, Ending the Dual
System of American Public Education: The Urgent Need for Legislative Action,
32 DEPAUL L. REV. 77 (1983).
189. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Section 1982
of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 prohibited discrimination by private individuals in
sale of property).
19851
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if that right would lead to discrimination in essentially public in-
stitutions such as schools and national organizations' 90 because the
government's interest in eliminating discrimination is too great.' 9'
V. The State's Interest
The Supreme Court has long held that state governments have a
responsiblility and a duty to maintain integrated public school sys-
tems. 92 In Brown v. Board of Education, 93 the Court found that
segregation in public schools had a detrimental effect on black
children 94 because it generated in those black children a feeling of
190. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Moose
Lodge, a black man was refused service at a private club's dining room solely
because of his race. The plaintiff sued contending that, since the Pennsylvania
liquor board issued a liquor license to the private club, the discrimination constituted
state action and was a violation of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court
held that this minimal state involvement was not sufficient to constitute "state
action," and a violation of the equal protection clause was not found. Id., at 171-
72. The distinction between Runyon and Moose Lodge lies in the fact that the
schools in Runyon were public in nature while the club in Moose Lodge was
distinctly private. NowAK, supra note 33 at 847.
191. See infra notes 192-224 and accompanying text for discussion of government's
interest in eradicating discrimination.
192. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (affirmative
duty to desegregate requires that school district not use policies and practices either
to impede desegregation or to perpetuate or re-establish dual system); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979) (school boards have continuing
affirmative duty to disestablish racially based dual systems); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973) (use of techniques such as manipulation of student
attendance zones and school site selection created racially segregated schools through-
out school district and thereby entitled petitioners to decree directing desegregation
of entire school district); Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402
U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (school authorities should make every effort to achieve greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation taking into account particulars of situation);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1971) (first
remedial responsibility of school boards is to eliminate invidious racial distinctions
with regard to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities);
Green v. County Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (school
boards have affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated); Bradley v.
School Bd. of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (delays in desegregating
school system were not tolerable); Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1964) (closing of public schools while simultaneously
granting tuition credits and tax concessions to white children in private, segregated
schools denied black children equal protection of laws guaranteed by fourteenth
amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (racially segregated
public schools maintained pursuant to state law violated rights of black school
children guaranteed by equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment).
193. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
194. Id. at 494.
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inferiority. 195 Segregation in private schools has been deemed
"invidious" ' 196 and attempts by state governments to foster such
segregation have been struck down. 9
7
In Norwood v. Harrison,'98 the State of Mississippi provided
textbooks to private schools, without reference to whether any par-
ticipating private school had a racially discriminatory admissions
policy. 199 Many private, segregated academies which were established
in response to desegregation orders, 200 received direct aid from the
state in the form of textbooks.20 The Court enjoined the practice
of lending textbooks to racially discriminatory private schools 20 2 and
declared that the state has an obligation not to support discrimination
in education.
20 3
The Court also discussed the invalidity of state aid to private,
racially segregated schools in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery2°4 in
which the city had granted segregated private schools exclusive access
to local parks and recreation facilities. 20 1 An injunction, preventing
such access, was upheld in part by the Court 20 6 which stated that
the city's actions enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private
195. Id. The Court further stated that the "separate but equal" doctrine had
no place in the field of public education and that "[sleparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
196. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
197. See infra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
198. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
199. Id. at 459.
200. Id. at 457.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 471. As to whether private individuals had a right to receive an
education in racially segregated academies, the Court's language is confusing. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Burger first stated that the case
did not "raise any question as to the right of citizens to maintain private schools
with admission limited to students of particular national origins, race, or religion
or of the authority of a State to allow such schools." Id. at 457- 58. However,
later in the opinion, Chief Justice Burger declared, "[i]nvidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by
the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections." Id. at 470.
203. Id. at 465; see also Wilmington Christian School v. Board of Educ., 545
F. Supp. 440, 448 (D. Del. 1982) (school board's policy of refusing to sell surplus
school buildings to private schools upheld because aid to private schools would
enhance their ability to drain white students from public school system); Poindexter
v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 853 (E.D. La. 1967)
(state may not induce, encourage, or promote private citizens to accomplish what
it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish).
204. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
205. Id. at 566.
206. Id. at 569.
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schools. 207 By having stadiums and recreational fields provided for
them, the segregated schools were able to save money and divert
their own funds to other educational programs .20  This assistance
tended to undermine significantly the city of Montgomery's obligation
to maintain a unitary school system. 209
Recently, the Supreme Court took a more aggressive role in elim-
inating racial segregation in private schools. Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954210 provides that organizations which
are operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or ed-
ucational purposes are exempt from taxation.21' In Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States,2 2 two private religious schools, Bob Jones
University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, were denied tax exempt
status because of their racially discriminatory admissions policies.21 1
When Bob Jones University sued to recover twenty-one dollars paid
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 2 4 the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) counterclaimed for unpaid federal unem-
ployment taxes in the amount of $489,675.59 plus interest.2 1 5 Golds-
boro Christian Schools sued for a tax refund, claiming it had been
improperly denied tax-exempt status. 21 6 The IRS counterclaimed for
$160,073.96 in unpaid social security and unemployment taxes. 21 7
207. Id. at 569.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1985).
211. Id. Section 501(c)(3) exempts the following organizations from taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition . . , or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no sub-
stantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . , and which does not
participate in, or intervene in . . . , any political campaign on behalf
of any candidate for public office.
Id.
212. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
213. Bob Jones University permitted the enrollment of unmarried blacks but
denied admission to applicants engaged in interracial marriage. Id. at 580-81.
Goldsboro Christian Schools maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy
based on its interpretation of the Bible that a biological mixing of the races violates
God's command. Id. at 583 n.6.
214. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1985).
215. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 582.
216. Id. at 584.
217. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that neither Bob Jones University nor
Goldsboro Christian Schools qualified as tax exempt organizations.
2
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that to qualify
for the tax exemption, an institution must show that its activity is
not contrary to public policy. 2 9 Justice Burger further stated that
an educational institution which racially discriminates does not confer
a public benefit 20 and that "racial discrimination in education violates
a most fundamental national public policy as well as rights of
individuals." ' 22' The Court stated that the right of a student not to
be segregated in schools on racial grounds is so fundamental and
persuasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of
law. 222 Finally, the Chief Justice declared that "the Government has
a fundamental, overrriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education-discrimination that prevailed with official approval, for
the first 165 years of this Nation's history. '223
VI. The Overbreadth Problem
Arguably, the Crenshaw County school board policy, 224 which
prohibited its employees from sending their children to private schools,
is unconstitutionally overbroad. 225 The Supreme Court has stated
that a governmental purpose of controlling or preventing constitu-
tionally regulated activities may not be achieved by means which
are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade areas of protected free-
doms. 226 The right of parents to send their children to private schools
is constitutionally protected. 27 If the Crenshaw County policy were
to be literally applied, a parent-teacher would be prevented from
sending a retarded or handicapped child to a private institution for
special treatment. 22 A teacher who wanted to send his child to a
218. Id. at 584-85.
219. Id. at 585.
220. Id. at 595-96.
221. Id. at 593.
222. Id., citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
223. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 604.
224. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text for discussion of the Crenshaw
County school board policy.
225. An overbroad statute is one which "encompasses constitutionally protected
conduct within its protective sweep." Note, First Amendment Vagueness and Ov-
erbreadth: Theoretical Revisions by the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610
(1978).
226. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
227. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
228. See Comment, Cook v. Hudson: The State's Interest in Integration Versus
1985]
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private school for religious training, even if the school did not
racially segregate, would be prevented from doing So. 2 29 Yet, ac-
cording to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a teacher has a constitutional
right to do just that. 20
Courts have held that an overbreadth challenge will succeed if it
can be proved that the complainants' conduct is protected by the
first and fourteenth amendments.23" ' However, the right of parents
to direct the education of their children should not be extended to
give constitutional protection to parents who send their children to
racially segregated private schools. 2 2 Therefore, the teachers in Stough
cannot claim that the board policy prohibiting its employees from
sending their children to private schools is overbroad. 233
However, even when a regulation is not overbroad as applied to
a particular litigant, that person has standing to assert the facial
overbreadth of the same regulation.2 14 Litigants may challenge a
statute to obtain a judicial determination that the statute's very
existence may cause others, not before the court, to refrain from
constitutionally protected activity. 233
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,23 6 three state employees of the State
of Oklahoma were charged with violations of a state law which
restricted the political activities of state employees. 237 The Court
rejected the overbreadth argument, drawing a distinction between
The First Amendment Rights of the Public Schoolteacher, 45 Miss. L.J. 953, 973
(1974).
229. Id.
230. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-535.
231. Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612, 61-7 (W.D. Va. 1982) (police department
regulation prohibiting members of police force from engaging "in criminal, infa-
mous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct
prejudicial to the Department" was not unconstitutionally overbroad); Wilson v.
Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 563 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (police department regulation
requiring its members and employees to "conduct their private lives in such a
manner as to avoid bringing the Department into disrepute" was not unconsti-
tutionally overbroad).
232. See supra notes 144-191 and accompanying text for discussion of Runyon
v. McCrary and Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
233. The public school teachers in Stough did not claim that the Crenshaw
County School Board policy was overbroad. Telephone interview with Michael E.
Jones, attorney for Crenshaw County School Board (Jan. 14, 1985).
234. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
235. Id. at 612.
236. See supra note 234.
237. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 605-06. The pertinent sections of the statute prohibited
state employees from soliciting or receiving contributions for any political orga-
nization or candidacy or from being a member of a political party. Id.
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speech and conduct. 218 Where it is conduct and not merely speech
that is involved, the overbreadth of a statute must be substantial
to be unconstitutional. 23 9
The third circuit, in Aiello v. City of Wilmington, Delaware,2 °
addressed the issue of which the factors are relevant to a deter-
mination of whether a statute is substantially overbroad. First, a
statute will be struck down for overbreadth if it lends itself to a
substantial number of applications. 24' Second, the "likely frequency
of a statute's conceivably impermissible applications ' 242 is examined.
Here, the third circuit suggested that if the frequency is relatively
low, it is more appropriate to guard against the statute's conceivably
impermissible applications through a case-by-case adjudication. 243
Third, the nature of the activity or conduct sought to be regulated
is scrutinized. 244 Expression or conduct which has traditionally been
given a high degree of first amendment protection is subject to close
judicial scrutiny.2 45 Finally, the nature of the state interest is rele-
vant. 246 Here, the third circuit suggested that facial invalidation must
be applied with restraint.2 47
In Stough v. Crenshaw County Board of Education ,248 the teachers
did not claim that the school board policy prohibiting them from
sending their children to private schools was overbroad. The policy
does, on its face, prohibit constitutionally protected activity. 49 How-
ever in Stough, the policy has thus far been applied only to the
plaintiff teachers who enrolled their children in Crenshaw Christian
Academy, a racially segregated school. Teachers who desired to send
their children to private schools other than Crenshaw Christian
Academy were granted exemptions from the policy. 20 Therefore,
since the likely frequency of the policy's conceivably impermissible
applications 2' is extremely low, the policy probably would not have
been found to be unconstitutional. 252
238. Id. at 615.
239. Id.
240. 623 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1980).
241. Id. at 854.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 855.
248. See supra note 1.
249. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
250. APPELLANT'S BRIEF at 6.
251. See Aiello, 623 F.2d at 854.
252. Id.
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VII. Recommendations For the Future: No Fundamental Right
to Send Children to Segregation Academies
Since the Supreme Court decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters253
parents have had a fundamental right to control the education of
their children.254 In Stough, the eleventh circuit assumed that the
teachers' desire to send their children to a segregated academy was
an exercise of this fundamental right .2  However, since Runyon v.
McCrary, the activity of parents sending their children to racially
segregated academies is not given constitutional protection.25 6
In light of Runyon v. McCrary, courts in the future should not
uphold a fundamental right of parents to send their children to
racially segregated private schools. Using the intermediate level of
scrutiny, if a public school board initiated a policy which prevented
its employees from sending their children to such institutions, the
board would merely be required to show a rational connection
between policy and the promotion of desegregation of the school
system. 57 Racially segregated academies have a negative impact on
attempts by school boards to desegregate public schools .2  Therefore,
even if courts find that public school teachers, as parents, do have
a constitutional right to send their children to racially segregated
academies, such a policy still can be upheld because it would further
the public school board's compelling interest in eliminating discrim-
ination in education.
VIII. Conclusion
While parents have a constitutional right to direct the education
of their children, this right should not be extended to allow parents
to send their children to private, racially segregated academies. An
extension of this right encourages the creation of such institutions.
If racially segregated private schools are permitted to flourish in
this country, de facto segregated school systems will be perpetuated.
Stuart Melnick
253. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
254. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
255. Stough, 744 F.2d at 1480.
256. See supra notes 144-73 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
258. See generally Tauber and James, Racial Segregation Among Public and
Private Schools, 55 Soc. OF EDUC. 133, 134 (1982) (empirical study of impact of
private schools on racial segregation in public schools).
[Vol. XIII
